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Abstract
We propose a tractable framework for quantifying the impact of fire sales on the
volatility and correlations of asset returns in a multi-asset setting. Our results enable
to quantify the impact of fire sales on the covariance structure of asset returns and
provide a quantitative explanation for spikes in volatility and correlations observed
during liquidation of large portfolios. These results allow to estimate the impact
and magnitude of fire sales from observation of market prices: we give conditions
for the identifiability of model parameters from time series of asset prices, propose
an estimator for the magnitude of fire sales in each asset class and study the con-
sistency and large sample properties of the estimator. We illustrate our estimation
methodology with two empirical examples: the hedge fund losses of August 2007
and the Great Deleveraging following the Lehman default.
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1 Introduction
Fire sales or, more generally, the sudden deleveraging of large financial portfolios,
have been recognized as a destabilizing factor in recent (and not-so-recent) financial
crises, contributing to unexpected spikes in volatility and correlations of asset returns
and resulting in spirals of losses for investors (Carlson, 2006; Khandani and Lo, 2011;
Brunnermeier, 2008). In particular, unexpected spikes in correlations across asset classes
have frequently occurred during market downturns (Cont and Wagalath, 2012; Bailey et al.,
2012), leading to a loss of diversification benefits for investors, precisely when such effects
were desirable.
For instance, during the first week of August 2007, when a large fund manager
deleveraged its positions in long-short market neutral equity strategies, other long-short
market neutral equity funds experienced huge losses, while in the meantime, index funds
were left unaffected (Khandani and Lo, 2011). On a larger scale, the Great Deleveraging
of financial institutions portfolios subsequent to the default of Lehman Brothers in fall
2008 led to an unprecedented peak in correlations across asset returns (Fratzscher, 2011).
The importance of fire sales as a factor of market instability is recognized in the
economic literature. Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011) characterize an asset fire sale
by a financial institution as a forced sale in which potential high valuation buyers are
affected by the same shocks as the financial institution, resulting in a sale of the asset
at a discounted price to non specialist buyers. They underline the fact that in the
presence of fire sales, losses by financial institutions with overlapping holdings become
self-reinforcing, leading to downward spirals for asset prices and, ultimately, to systemic
risk. Pedersen (2009) describes qualitatively the effects of investors running for the exit
and the spirals of losses and spillover effects they generate. Shin (2010) proposes a two
period equilibrium model which takes into account the supply and demand generated
by investors reacting to a price move and shows how feedback effects contribute to the
amplification of market moves and systemic risk. Brunnermeier (2008) describes the
channel through which losses in mortgage backed securities during the recent financial
crisis led to huge losses in equity markets, although those two assets classes had been
historically uncorrelated.
The empirical link between fire sales and correlation between asset returns has been
documented in several recent studies. Coval and Stafford (2007) give empirical evidence
for fire sales by open end mutual funds by studying the transactions caused by capi-
tal flows. They show that funds in distress experience outflows of capital by investors
which result in fire sales in existing positions, creating a price pressure in the securi-
ties held in common by distressed funds. Jotikasthira et al. (2011) lead an empirical
investigation on the effects of fund flows from developed countries to emerging markets.
They show that such investment flows generate forced trading by fund managers, affect-
ing asset prices and correlations between emerging markets and creating a new channel
through which shocks are transmitted from developed markets to emerging markets.
Anton and Polk (2008) find empirically that common active mutual fund ownership pre-
dicts cross-sectional variation in return realized covariance.
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However, although the empirical examples cited above are related to liquidation of
large portfolios, most theoretical studies focus for simplicity on fire sales in a single
asset market and thus are not able to investigate the effect of fire sales on asset return
correlations and the resulting limits to diversification alluded to above.
Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) propose a simple framework for modeling price dy-
namics which takes into account the ownership structure of financial assets, considered
as given exogenously. Cont and Wagalath (2012) model the systematic supply and de-
mand generated by investors exiting a large distressed fund and quantify its impact on
asset returns.
We propose here a tractable framework for modeling and estimating the impact of fire
sales in multiple funds on the volatility and correlations of asset returns in a multi-asset
setting. We explore the mathematical properties of the model in the continuous-time
limit and derive analytical results relating the realized covariance of asset returns to
the parameters describing the volume of fire sales. In particular, we show that, starting
from homoscedastic inputs, such feedback effects naturally generate heteroscedasticity
in the covariance structure of asset returns, thus providing an economic interpretation
for various multivariate models of heteroscedasticity in the recent literature (Engle,
2002; Da Fonseca et al., 2008; Gourie´roux et al., 2009; Stelzer, 2010). Our results allow
for a structural explanation for the variability observed in measures of cross sectional
dependence in asset returns (Bailey et al., 2012), by linking such increases in cross-
sectional correlation to the deleveraging of large portfolios.
The analytically tractable nature of these results allows to explore in detail the
problem of estimating these parameters from empirical observations of price series; we
explore the corresponding identification problem and propose a method for estimating
the magnitude of distressed selling in each asset class, and study the consistency and
large sample properties of the proposed estimator. These results provide a quantitative
framework for the ’forensic analysis’ of the impact of fire sales and distressed selling,
which we illustrate with two empirical examples: the August 2007 hedge fund losses and
the Great Deleveraging of bank portfolios following the default of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008.
Our framework allows to explain large shifts in the realized covariance structure of
asset returns in terms of supply and demand patterns across asset classes, which makes
such events easier to analyze and understand. This estimation procedure may be useful
for regulators in view of investigating unusual market events in a systematic way, moving
a step in the direction proposed by Fielding et al. (2011), who underlined the importance
of systematically investigating all ’systemic risk’ events in financial markets, as done by
the National Transportation Safety Board for major civil transportation accidents.
Outline This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple framework for
modeling the impact of fire sales in various funds on asset returns. Section 3 resolves
the question of the identification and estimation of the model parameters, characterizing
the fire sales. Section 4 displays the results of our estimation procedure on liquidations
occurring after the collapse of Lehman Brothers while Section 5 is focused on the study
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of the positions liquidated during the first week of August 2007.
2 Fire sales and endogenous risk
2.1 Impact of fire sales on price dynamics: a multiperiod model
Consider a financial market where n assets are traded at discrete dates tk = kτ , multiples
of a time step τ (taken to be a trading day in the empirical examples). The value of
asset i at date tk is denoted S
i
k. We consider J institutional investors trading in these
assets: fund j initially holds αji units of asset i. The value of this (benchmark) portfolio
at date tk is denoted V
j
k =
∑
1≤i≤n
αjiS
i
k. Note that α
j
i may be negative and the funds can
have short positions.
The impact of (exogenous) economic factors (’fundamentals’) on prices is modeled
through an IID sequence (ξk)k≥1 of Rn-valued centered random variables, such that
in the absence of fire sales, the return of asset i during period [tk, tk+1] is given by
τmi +
√
τξik+1. Here mi represents the expected return of asset i in the absence of fire
sales and the ’fundamental’ covariance matrix Σ, defined by
Σi,j = cov(ξ
i
k, ξ
j
k)
represents the covariance structure of returns in the absence of large systematic trades
by institutional investors.
Due to such exogenous shocks, the value of the benchmark portfolio j changes, during
[tk, tk+1], from V
j
k to
(V jk+1)
∗ =
∑
1≤i≤n
αjiS
i
k(1 + τmi +
√
τξik+1).
Typically, over short time horizons of a few days, institutional investors do not al-
ter their allocations and hold on to their positions. However, the occurrence of large
losses typically leads the fund to sell off part of its assets (Coval and Stafford, 2007;
Jotikasthira et al., 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). Such distressed selling may be due
to
 investors redeeming (or expanding) their positions depending on the performance of
the funds, causing inflows and outflows of capital. This mechanism is described by
Coval and Stafford (2007), who show empirically that funds in distress experience
outflows of capital by investors and explain that, as the ability of borrowing is
reduced for distressed funds and regulation and self-imposed constraints prevent
them from short-selling other securities, such outflows of capital result in fire sales
in existing positions.
 capital requirements which lead fund managers to deleverage their portfolios when
faced with trading losses (Danielsson et al., 2004),
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 rule based strategies –such as portfolio insurance– which result in selling when a
fund underperforms (Genotte and Leland, 1990),
 sale of assets held as collateral by creditors of distressed funds (Shleifer and Vishny,
2011).
The impact of fire sales may also be exacerbated by short selling and predatory trading:
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) show that, in the presence of fire sales in a distressed
fund, the mean-variance optimal strategy for other investors is to short sell the assets
held by the distressed fund and buy them back after the period of distress. A common
feature of these mechanisms is that they react to a (negative) change in fund value.
Here we do not model each of these mechanisms in detail but focus instead on their
aggregate effect. This aggregate effect may be modeled in a parsimonious manner by
introducing a deleveraging schedule, represented by a function fj which measures the
systematic supply/demand generated by the fund j as a function of the fund’s return:
when the value of the portfolio j drops from V jk to (V
j
k+1)
∗ due to market shocks, a
portion
fj
(
V jk
V j0
)
− fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
of the fund is liquidated between tk and tk+1.
As shown by Jotikasthira et al. (2011), negative returns for a fund lead to outflows
of capital from this fund: this implies that fj is an increasing function. Furthermore, we
choose fj to be concave, capturing the fact that fire sales accelerate as the fund exhibits
larger losses. Figure 1 displays an example of such a deleveraging schedule fj.
When the trades are sizable with respect to the average trading volume, the supply
/ demand generated by this deleveraging strategy impacts asset prices. We introduce,
for each asset i, a price impact function φi(.) which captures this effect: the impact of
buying v shares (where v < 0 represents a sale) on the return of asset i is φi(v). We
assume that φi : R 7→ R is increasing and φi(0) = 0.
The impact of fire sales on the return of asset i is then equal to
φi
 ∑
1≤j≤J
αji
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
)) (1)
At each period, the return of asset i is the sum of a fundamental term τmi+
√
τξik+1
plus an endogenous term, which is due to the price impact of fire sales.
Sik+1 = S
i
k
1 + τmi +√τξik+1 + φi
 ∑
1≤j≤J
αji
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
)) (2)
where
V jk =
∑
1≤i≤n
αjiS
i
k (3)
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Figure 1: Example of a deleveraging schedule fj
and
(V jk+1)
∗ =
∑
1≤i≤n
αjiS
i
k(1 + τmi +
√
τξik+1) (4)
Sk, (V
j
k )1≤j≤J S
∗
k+1, ((V
j
k+1)
∗)1≤j≤J Sk+1, (V
j
k+1)1≤j≤J
exogenous
factors (ξk+1)
fire sales
Equations (2), (3) and (4) show that Sk+1 depends only on its value at tk and on
ξk+1, which is independent of events previous to tk. The price vector S is thus a Markov
chain.
This multiperiod model exhibits interesting properties: in particular, as shown in
Cont and Wagalath (2012), the presence of distressed selling induces an endogenous,
heteroscedastic component in the covariance structure of returns, which leads to state-
dependent correlations, even in the absence of any heteroscedasticity in the fundamen-
tals.
Figure 2 shows an example of such endogenous correlations: we simulated 106 price
trajectories of this multiperiod model with the parameters used in Section 3.4 and for
each trajectory, we computed the realized correlation between all pairs of assets. We find
that even in the case where the exogenous shocks driving the asset values are indepen-
dent (i.e. the ’fundamental’ covariance matrix Σ is diagonal), the presence of distressed
selling leads to significant realized correlations, thereby increasing the volatility experi-
enced by investors holding the fund during episodes of fire sales. This phenomenon may
substantially decrease the benefits of diversification.
Our goal is to explore such effects systematically and propose a method for estimating
their impact on price dynamics.
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Figure 2: Distribution of realized correlation between two securities in the presence of
distressed selling (case of zero fundamental correlation)
2.2 Continuous time limit
The multiperiod model above is rather cumbersome to study directly; in the sequel we
focus its continuous time limit, which is analytically tractable and more easily related to
commonly used diffusion models for price dynamics. This will allow us to compute real-
ized covariances between asset returns in the presence of feedback effects from distressed
selling.
For two n-dimensional vectors x and y, we denote x.y =
∑
1≤i≤n
xiyi the scalar product
between vectors x and y. For M ∈ Mn(R), M t is the transpose of matrix M. Sn(R)
(resp. S+n (R)) denotes the set of real valued symmetric matrices (resp. real valued
symmetric positive semi-definite matrices). For a sequence X(τ) of random variables, we
denote the fact that X(τ) converges in law (resp. in probability) to X when τ goes to
zero by X(τ) ⇒
τ→0
X (resp. X(τ)
P→
τ→0
X).
We make the following assumption on the deleveraging schedules fj:
Assumption 2.1 For all 1 ≤ j ≤ J , fj is increasing and
fj ∈ C30(R)
where Cp0(R) denotes the set of real-valued, p-times continuously differentiable maps
whose derivatives of order 1 ≤ l ≤ p have compact support.
In particular fj is constant for large values and very small values of its argument, and
monotone in between. This assumption has a natural interpretation in our context:
fire sales occur when funds underperform, i.e. when the value of the fund relative to a
benchmark falls below a threshold and cease when the fund defaults.
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Theorem 2.2 Under Assumption 2.1, if φi ∈ C3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and E(‖ξ‖4) < ∞,
the process (S⌊ t
τ
⌋)t≥0 converges weakly, as the time step τ goes to 0, to a diffusion process(
Pt = (P
1
t , ...P
n
t )
)
t≥0 solution of the stochastic differential equation
dP it
P it
= µi(Pt)dt+ (σ(Pt)dWt)i 1 ≤ i ≤ n
where µ (resp., σ) is a Rn-valued (resp. matrix-valued) mapping defined by
µi(Pt) = mi + φ
′
i(0)
∑
1≤j≤J
αji
f ′j
(
V jt
V j0
)
πjt .m
V j0
+
1
2
f
′′
j
(
V jt
V j0
)
πjt .Σπ
j
t(
V j0
)2
 (5)
+
φ′′i (0)
2
∑
1≤j,l≤J
(
αjiα
l
if
′
j
(
V jt
V j0
)
f ′l
(
V lt
V l0
)
πjt .Σπ
l
t
V j0 V
l
0
)
σi,k(Pt) = Ai,k + φ
′
i(0)
∑
1≤j≤J
αjif
′
j(
V jt
V j0
)
(
Aπjt
)
k
V j0
(6)
Here Wt is an n-dimensional Brownian motion, π
j
t =
 α
j
1P
1
t
...
αjnPnt
 is the (dollar) allo-
cation of fund j, V jt =
∑
1≤k≤n
αjkP
k
t the value of fund j and A is a square-root of the
fundamental covariance matrix: AAt = Σ.
The proof of this Theorem is given in Appendix A.
Remark 2.3 The limit price process that we exhibit in Theorem 2.2 depends on the
price impact functions only through their first and second derivatives in 0, φ′i(0) and
φ′′i (0). In particular, the expression of σ in (6) shows that realized volatilities and realized
correlations of asset returns depend only on the slope φ′i(0) of the price impact function.
This remark shows that, under our assumptions, a linear price impact function would
lead to the same realized covariance structure for asset returns in the continuous time
limit.
As a consequence, in the remainder of this paper, we use the assumption of linear price
impact: λi =
1
φ′i(0)
then corresponds to the market depth for asset i and is interpreted
as the number of shares an investor has to buy in order to increase the price of asset i
by 1%.
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Corollary 2.4 (Case of linear price impact) Under Assumption 2.1, if E(‖ξ‖4) <
∞, the process (S⌊ t
τ
⌋)t≥0 converges weakly, as the time step τ goes to 0, to a diffusion
process
(
Pt = (P
1
t , ...P
n
t )
)
t≥0 solution of the stochastic differential equation
dP it
P it
= µi(Pt)dt+ (σ(Pt)dWt)i 1 ≤ i ≤ n
where µ (resp., σ) is a Rn-valued (resp. matrix-valued) mapping defined by
µi(Pt) = mi +
1
λi
∑
1≤j≤J
αji
f ′j
(
V jt
V j0
)
πjt .m
V j0
+
1
2
f
′′
j
(
V jt
V j0
)
πjt .Σπ
j
t(
V j0
)2
 (7)
σi,k(Pt) = Ai,k +
1
λi
∑
1≤j≤J
αjif
′
j(
V jt
V j0
)
(
Aπjt
)
k
V j0
(8)
where Wt, π
j
t , V
j
t and A are defined in Theorem 2.2.
When market depths are infinite, the price dynamics follows a multivariate exponen-
tial Brownian motion. In the presence of fire sales by distressed sellers, the fundamental
dynamics of the assets is modified.
Using Theorem 2.4 and Ito’s formula, we deduce that the log price Xit = ln(P
i
t )
verifies the following stochastic differential equation:
dXit =
(
µi(expXt)− 1
2
(σ(expXt)σ(expXt)
t)i,i
)
dt+ (σ(expXt)dWt)i (9)
where σ, µ and W are defined in Theorem 2.4 and expXt is a n dimensional column
vector with i-th term equal to expXit .
2.3 Realized covariance in the presence of fire sales
The realized covariance (Andersen et al., 2003; Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2004)
between dates t1 and t2 computed at time resolution τ is defined as
Ĉ
(τ)
[t1,t2]
=
1
t2 − t1 ([X,X]
(τ)
t2 − [X,X]
(τ)
t1 ) (10)
where [X,X]
(τ)
t =
(
[Xi,Xk]
(τ)
t
)
1≤i,k≤n
with
[Xi,Xk]
(τ)
t =
∑
1≤l≤⌊t/τ⌋
(Xilτ −Xi(l−1)τ )(Xklτ −Xk(l−1)τ ) (11)
As the time step τ goes to zero,
(
[X,X](τ)
)
t≥0 converges in probability to an increasing,
S+n (R)-valued process ([X,X])t≥0, the quadratic covariation of X Jacod and Protter
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(2012). We define the S+n (R)-valued process c = (ct)t≥0, which corresponds intuitively
to the ’instantaneous covariance’ of returns, as the derivative of the quadratic covariation
process:
[X,X]t =
∫ t
0
csds (12)
Theorem 2.4 allows to compute the realized covariance matrix for the n assets.
Proposition 2.5 The instantaneous covariance matrix of returns, ct, defined in (12),
is given by:
ct = Σ+
∑
1≤j≤J
[
1
V j0
f
′
j(
V jt
V j0
)
(
Λj(π
j
t )
tΣ+ ΣπjtΛ
t
j
)]
+
∑
1≤j,k≤J
πjt .Σπ
k
t
V j0 V
k
0
f
′
j(
V jt
V j0
)f
′
k(
V kt
V k0
)ΛjΛ
t
k
where
πjt =
 α
j
1P
1
t
...
αjnPnt
 denotes the (dollar) holdings of fund j and Λj =

αj
1
λ1
...
αjn
λn
 rep-
resents the positions of fund j in each market as a fraction of the respective market
depth.
The realized covariance matrix between t1 and t2 is then defined as
C[t1,t2] =
1
t2 − t1
∫ t2
t1
ct dt
Denote
Λ = (Λ1, ...,ΛJ ) ∈ Mn×J(R) (13)
where Λj is defined in Proposition 2.5. We observe that the excess realized covariance
terms due to fire sales contain a term of order one in ‖Λ‖ plus higher order terms:
ct = Σ+
∑
1≤j≤n
[
1
V j0
f
′
j(
V jt
V j0
)
(
Λj(π
j
t )
tΣ+ ΣπjtΛ
t
j
)]
+O(‖Λ‖2)
where O(‖Λ‖
2)
‖Λ‖2 is bounded when ‖Λ‖ → 0. This result is due to the fact that under
Assumption 2.1, the second order terms
πjt .Σπ
k
t
V j
0
V k
0
f
′
j(
V jt
V j
0
)f
′
k(
V kt
V k
0
) in the expression of ct in
Proposition 2.5 are bounded. In practice, this first order approximation is precise enough
Cont and Wagalath (2012) and we will focus on this approximation in the numerical
examples.
Fire sales impact realized covariances between assets. In the presence of fire sales,
realized covariance is the sum of the fundamental covariance matrix Σ and an excess
realized covariance which is liquidity dependent and path dependent. The magnitude
of this endogenous impact is measured by the vectors Λj , which represent the position
of each fund as a fraction of market depth. The volume generated by fire sales in fund
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j on each asset i is equal to αji × f ′j and its impact on the return of asset i is equal
to
αj
i
λi
× f ′j. This impact can be significant even if the asset is very liquid, when the
positions liquidated are large enough compared to the asset’s market depth. Thus,
fire sales endogenously lead to empirically plausible patterns of heteroscedasticity in the
covariance structure of asset returns.
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that the following assumption holds:
Assumption 2.6 There are no fire sales between 0 and T and each fund j liquidates
between T and T + τliq at a constant rate γj.
The following Corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.5.
Corollary 2.7 The realized covariance matrices between 0 and T and between T and
T + τliq are respectively equal to:
C[0,T ] =
1
T
∫ T
0
ct dt = Σ
and
C[T,T+τliq] =
1
τliq
∫ T+τliq
T
ct dt = Σ+ LM0ΠΣ+ ΣΠM0L+O(‖Λ‖2) (14)
with
M0 =
∑
1≤j≤J
γj
V j0
× αj(αj)t (15)
where αj =
 α1...
αn
 is the vector of positions of fund j and L and Π are diagonal
matrices with i-th diagonal term equal respectively to 1λi and
1
τliq
∫ T+τliq
T P
i
t dt.
In the absence of distressed selling between 0 and T, the realized covariances between
asset returns during this period are equal to their fundamental value. Between T and
T+τliq, fire sales affect the realized covariance between asset returns. The excess realized
covariance is characterized by a matrixM0, defined in (15), which reflects the magnitude
of the fire sales. Note that we do not assume that all the funds are liquidating between
T and T + τliq. A fund j which is not subject to fire sales during this period of time has
a rate of liquidation γj equal to zero.
In (15), αj(αj)t is a n × n symmetric matrix representing an orthogonal projection
on fund j’s positions and hence M is a sum of projectors. The symmetric matrix M
captures the direction and intensity of liquidations in the J funds.
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2.4 Spillover effects
Consider now the situation where a distressed fund with positions (α1, ..., αn) is liquidat-
ing its assets over a period [t1, t2]. As argued above, this leads to endogenous volatility
and correlations in asset prices, which then modifies the volatility experienced by any
other fund holding the same assets.
Proposition 2.5 allows to compute the magnitude of this volatility spillover effect
(Cont and Wagalath, 2012). The following result shows that the realized variance of
a (small) fund with positions (µit, i = 1..n) is the sum of its the realized volatility in
absence of distressed selling and an endogenous term which represents the impact of
distressed selling in the
Corollary 2.8 (Spillover effects) In the presence of fire sales in a reference fund with
positions α, the realized variance for a target fund with positions (µit)1≤i≤n between t1
and t2 is equal to
1
t2−t1
∫ t2
t1
γs ds where
γsM
2
s = π
µ
s .Σπ
µ
s +
2f
′
(VsV0 )
V0
(πµs .Σπ
α
s )(Λ.π
µ
s ) +
f
′
(VsV0 )
2
V 20
(παs .Σπ
α
s )(Λ.π
µ
s )
2 (16)
where παs =
 α1P
1
s
...
αnP
n
s
 and πµs =
 µ
1
tP
1
s
...
µnt P
n
s
 denote respectively the (dollar) holdings
of the reference fund and the target fund, Ms =
∑
1≤i≤n
µisP
i
s is the target fund’s value,
and Λ = (α1λ1 , ...,
αn
λn
) represents the positions of the reference fund in each market as a
fraction of the respective market depth.
The second term in (16), which represents the price-mediated contagion of endoge-
nous risk from the distressed fund to other funds holding the same assets, is maximal for
funds whose positions are colinear to those of the distressed fund. On the other hand,
these endogenous terms are zero if the two portfolio verify an ’orthogonality condition’
Λ.πµt =
n∑
i=1
αi
λi
µitP
i
t = 0, (17)
in which case the fund with positions µt is not affected by the fire sales of assets by the
distressed fund.
3 Identification and estimation
3.1 Inverse problem and identifiability
Corollary 2.7 gives us the modification of the realized covariance matrix due to fire sales
in J funds, where each fund j has holdings (αj1, ..., α
j
n) and liquidates at a constant rate
γj between dates T and T + τliq. We now consider the inverse problem of explaining
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’abnormal’ patterns in realized covariance and volatility in the presence of fire sales
and estimating the parameters of the liquidated portfolio from empirical observations.
Mathematically, this boils down to answering the following question: knowing that liq-
uidations occurred at a constant rate between two dates T and T + τliq and observing
the modification of realized covariance matrices that such distressed selling generates, is
it possible, given Σ, C[T,T+τliq], L and Π, to find M such that
C[T,T+τliq] = Σ+ LMΠΣ+ ΣΠML (18)
The following proposition gives conditions under which this inverse problem is well-
posed i.e. the parameter M is identifiable:
Proposition 3.1 (Identifiability) Let L and Π be diagonal matrices with
Lii =
1
λi
Πii =
1
τliq
∫ T+τliq
T
P it dt
If ΠΣL−1 is diagonalizable with strictly positive eigenvalues i.e. there exists an in-
vertible matrix Ω and φ1 > 0,...,φn > 0 such that
Ω−1ΠΣL−1Ω =
φ1 0. . .
0 φn

then there exists a unique symmetric n× n matrix M verifying (18) which is given
by
M = Φ(Σ, C[T,T+τliq]) (19)
where Φ(Σ, C) is a matrix defined by[
ΩtΦ(Σ, C)Ω
]
p,q
=
1
φp + φq
× [ΩtL−1(C − Σ)L−1Ω]
p,q
(20)
In this case, the unique solution M of (18) verifies
M =M0 +O(‖Λ‖2) (21)
where M0 is defined in (15).
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B. Thanks to (21), we deduce the
following corollary:
Corollary 3.2 The knowledge of M allows to estimate, up to an error term of order
one in ‖Λ‖, the volume of fire sales in asset class i between T and T + τliq:
∑
1≤j≤J
αjiP
i
T
V jT
× γj ×
(
V jT − V jT+τliq
V j0
)
× V jT
= (0, ..., 0, P iT , 0, ..., 0)M(PT − PT+τliq ) +O(‖Λ‖2)
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Note that the knowledge of M does not allow in general to reconstitute the detail
of fire sales in each fund. Indeed, the decomposition of M given in (15) is not always
unique. Nevertheless, when different funds engage in similar patterns of fire sales, the
common component of these patterns may be recovered from the principal eigenvector
of M . In the empirical examples, we find thatM has one large eigenvalue, meaning that
liquidations were concentrated in one direction.
3.2 Consistency and large sample properties
In the remainder of the paper, we make the following assumptions, which guarantees
that the identification problem is well-posed in the sense of Proposition 3.1
Assumption 3.3 ΠΣL−1 is diagonalisable with distinct strictly positive eigenvalues.
As a consequence, (19) (20) (21) hold. We require that the eigenvalues of ΠΣL−1
are distinct so that the set of matrices Σ verifying Assumption 3.3 is an open subset of
Sn(R) which allows for the study of the differentiability of Φ defined in (20).
Proposition 3.1 states that if we know L = diag( 1λi ), Π = diag(
1
τliq
∫ T+τliq
T P
i
t dt),
the realized covariance matrix between 0 and T, Σ, and the realized covariance matrix
between T and T + τliq, C[T,T+τliq], we can reconstitute M and hence the characteristics
of the aggregate liquidations between T and T + τliq, according to Corollary 3.2.
The market depth matrix L can be estimated precisely using intraday data. Obizhaeva
Obizhaeva (2011) calculates the market depths of US stocks. We will discuss about the
methodology to estimate L in Section 4. Π may be computed from time series of prices.
However, in practice, we only have estimators of Σ and C[T,T+τliq], denoted respec-
tively Σ̂ (τ) and Ĉ (τ), which converge in probability (see for example (Jacod and Protter,
2012, Theorem 3.3.1, Ch. 5)) to Σ and C[T,T+τliq] respectively.
Σ̂ (τ) =
1
T
[X,X]
(τ)
T
P→
τ→0
Σ (22)
and
Ĉ (τ) =
1
τliq
(
[X,X]
(τ)
T+τliq
− [X,X](τ)T
)
P→
τ→0
C[T,T+τliq] (23)
where the process [X,X](τ) is defined in (11). Σ̂ (τ) and Ĉ (τ) are the realized covariance
with resolution τ between 0 and T and T and T + τliq respectively.
We can hence define an estimator M̂ (τ) of M by:
M̂ (τ) = Φ(Σ̂ (τ), Ĉ (τ)) (24)
where Φ is defined in (20).
Proposition 3.4 (Consistency) The estimator M̂ (τ) defined in (20)-(22)-(23)-(24)
is consistent:
M̂ (τ) = Φ(Σ̂ (τ), Ĉ (τ))
P→
τ→0
M
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The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B.
To study the asymptotic joint distribution of the estimators Σ̂ (τ) and Ĉ (τ), we
need to extend (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) to a larger probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t≥0, P˜) , which
supports a Brownian motion W˜ describing the estimation errors in (24).
Lemma 3.5 There exists a n×n dimensional process Z, defined on a very good filtered
extension (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t≥0, P˜) of (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) verifying
Z
ij
t =
1√
2
∑
1≤k,l≤n
∫ t
0
(
V˜ ij,kls + V˜
ji,kl
s
)
dW˜ kls (25)
where W˜ is a n2-dimensional Brownian motion adapted to F˜t and V˜ is aMn2×n2(R)-
valued process verifying
(V˜tV˜
t
t )
ij,kl = [σσt(Pt)]i,k[σσ
t(Pt)]j,l (26)
such that, when τ goes to zero:
1√
τ
(
[X,X](τ) − [X,X]
)
⇒
τ→0
Z
where σ is defined in (8) and [X,X](τ) and [X,X] in (11).
This implies that the estimator (Σ̂(τ), Ĉ(τ)) defined in (22) and (23) verifies the
following central limit theorem:
1√
τ
[(
Σ̂(τ)
Ĉ(τ)
)
−
(
Σ
C[T,T+τliq]
)]
⇒
τ→0
(
1
T ZT
1
τliq
(ZT+τliq − ZT )
)
(27)
Proof Recall that the log price Xit = ln(P
i
t ) verifies the stochastic differential equation
given in (9). This implies that X is continuous and that its drift and volatility, which
are bounded, verify ∀t ≥ 0:∫ t
0
 ∑
1≤i≤n
(
µi(Pt)− 1
2
(σ(Pt)σt(Pt)
t)i,i
)2
+ ‖σσt(Pt)‖2
 ds <∞
By (Jacod and Protter, 2012, Theorem 5.4.2, Ch.5) we find that Lemma 3.5 holds.
The following proposition gives us the rate of convergence of the estimator M̂ (τ) and
its asymptotic distribution.
Proposition 3.6 (Asymptotic distribution of estimator)
1√
τ
(
M̂ (τ) −M
)
⇒
τ→0
∇Φ
(
Σ, C[T,T+τliq]
)
.
(
1
T ZT
1
τliq
(ZT+τliq − ZT )
)
(28)
where Z is defined in (25) and ∇Φ is the derivative of Φ.
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B. Proposition 3.6 allows to compute
confidence intervals, following the approach outlined in Jacod and Protter (2012).
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3.3 Testing for the presence of fire sales
Proposition 3.6 allows to test whetherM 6= 0 i.e. if significant fire sales occurred between
T and T + τliq. Consider the null hypothesis
M = 0 (H0)
Under assumption (H0), there are no fire sales in the J funds between T and T + τliq.
The central limit theorem given in Proposition 3.6 can be simplified as follows:
Proposition 3.7 Under the null hypothesis (H0), the estimator M̂
(τ) verifies the fol-
lowing central limit theorem:
1√
τ
M̂ (τ) ⇒
τ→0
Φ
(
Σ,Σ+
1
τliq
(ZT+τliq − ZT )−
1
T
ZT
)
where Z is a n2-dimensional Brownian motion with covariance
cov(Z
i,j
, Z
k,l
) = Σi,kΣj,l +Σi,lΣj,k
and Φ is defined in (20).
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix C.
This result allows to test whether the variability in the realized covariance of asset
returns during [T, T + τliq] may be explained by the superposition of homoscedastic
fundamental covariance structure and feedback effects from fire sales. To do this, we
estimate the matrixM and test the nullity of the liquidation volumes derived in Corollary
(3.2):
Corollary 3.8 Under the null hypothesis (H0),
1√
τ
(
P tT M̂
(τ)(PT − PT+τliq )
)
⇒
τ→0
N
0,( 1
T
+
1
τliq
) ∑
1≤i,j,k,l≤n
mijmkl (ΣikΣjl +ΣjkΣil)

with mij =
∑
1≤p,q≤n
[Ω−1PT ]p[Ω−1(PT − PT+τliq )]q
φp + φq
ΩipΩjqλiλj where Ω and (φi)1≤i≤n are
defined in Proposition 3.1, Pt is the vector of prices at date t and (λi)1≤i≤n are the asset
market depths.
The proof of this corollary is given in Appendix D.
Corollary 3.8 gives the asymptotic law of
(
P tT M̂
(τ)(PT − PT+τliq )
)
, the estimated
volume of liquidations. We can then define a level l such that
P
(∣∣∣P tT M̂ (τ)(PT − PT+τliq )∣∣∣ > l) ≤ 1− pl
where pl is typically equal to 95% or 99%. If we find that
∣∣∣P tT M̂ (τ)(PT − PT+τliq )∣∣∣ > l,
then the null hypothesis of no fire sales may be rejected at confidence level pl.
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3.4 Numerical experiments
To assess the accuracy of these estimators in samples of realistic size, we first apply this
test to a simulated discrete-time market. We consider the case of one fund investing
in n = 20 assets, with fundamental volatility 30% and zero fundamental correlation.
Furthermore, we assume that all assets have the same market depth λ and that the fund
is initially equally weighted across these assets:
αiP i0
V0
= 1n . The size of the fund can be
captured by the vector Λ, defined in Proposition 2.5, which represents the size of the
fund’s position in each asset as a fraction of the asset’s market depth. In our simulations,
we choose this ratio equal to 20%.
We examine the results of our estimation method in the two following cases:
 the fund is not subject to distressed selling
 the fund is subject to distressed selling: when the fund value drops below β0 = 95%
of its initial value, the manager deleverages the fund portfolio.
Figure 3 displays a trajectory for the fund’s value, where the fund was subject to
distressed selling between T=116 days and T + τliq = 127 days.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
Time
Fu
nd
 V
al
ue
Threshold below which
there is distressed selling
Liquidation during
this period
Figure 3: Fund value
We consider a market where trading is possible every hour of each trading day (τ =
1
6×250 if we consider that a trading day is 6 hour long). We calculate Σ̂
(τ) and Ĉ(τ) and we
apply our estimation procedure and calculate in each case (no liquidation and liquidation
cases) an estimate for the volume of liquidations. Using 3.8, we can determine, at
confidence level 95%, for example, whether there has been a liquidation or not.
Under the assumption (H0) that M = 0 and using Lemma 3.8 we find that
P
(∣∣∣P tT M̂ (τ)(PT − PT+τliq )∣∣∣ > 3.2 × 103) ≤ 5%
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We find that
 when there are no fire sales,
(
P tT M̂
(τ)(PT − PT+τliq )
)
= 203 < 3.2 × 103 and we
cannot reject assumption (H0)
 when fire sales occur,
(
P tT M̂
(τ)(PT − PT+τliq )
)
= 7× 103 > 3.2× 103 and, with a
confidence level of 95%, we reject assumption (H0).
Let us now focus on the results of our estimation procedure in the case where there were
liquidations and check whether it allows for a proper reconstitution of the liquidated
portfolio. We find that the estimates for the proportions liquidated
αiP i0
V0
are all positive
and ranging from 2% to 10%, around the true value which is 120 = 5%. As expected by
the central limit theorem, the error between the true value and the estimated value is of
the order of 1√
6×250 = 2.5%.
4 The Great Deleveraging of Fall 2008
Lehman Brothers was the fourth largest investment bank in the USA. During the year
2008, it experienced severe losses, caused mainly by the subprime mortgage crisis, and
on September, 15th, 2008, it filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, citing bank debt
of $613 billion, $155 billion in bond debt, and assets worth $639 billion, becoming the
largest bankruptcy filing in the US history.
The failure of Lehman Brothers generated liquidations and deleveraging in all asset
classes all over the world. The collapse of this huge institution was such a shock to fi-
nancial markets - major equity indices all lost around 10% on that day - that it triggered
stop loss and deleveraging strategies among a remarkable number of financial institu-
tions worldwide. Risk measures of portfolios, for example the value at risk, increased
sharply, obliging financial institutions to hold more cash, which they got by deleveraging
their portfolios, rather than by issuing debt which would have been very costly at such
distressed times.
This massive deleveraging has been documented in several empirical studies. Fratzscher
(2011) studies the effect of key events, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, on capi-
tal flows. He uses a dataset on portfolio capital flows and performance at the fund level,
from EPFR, and containing daily, weekly and monthly flows for more than 16000 equity
funds and 8000 bond funds, domiciled in 50 countries. He aggregates the net capital flows
(ie net of valuation changes) for each country and finds that they are negative for all the
countries of the study. This means that fund managers of such funds deleveraged their
positions after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, sometimes in dramatic proportions: in
some cases, the ouflows can represent up to 30% of the assets under management by the
funds.
Our method allows to estimate the aggregate portfolio of liquidations during this
period. We report below the result of the estimation method described in Section 3
SPDRs and components of the Eurostoxx 50 index. Figure 4 shows that the increase
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of average correlation in these two equity baskets lasted for around three months after
September, 15th, 2008. As a consequence, we examine liquidations that occured between
September, 15th, 2008 and December, 31st, 2008.
We calculate the realized covariance matrices respectively between 02/01/2008 and
T = 09/15/2008 and between T = 09/15/2008 and T + τliq = 12/31/2008 and apply
the estimation procedure described in Section 3. We use a linear price impact model
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Figure 4: One-year average correlation among SPDRs and Eurostoxx 50
Obizhaeva (2011); Cont et al. (2010). To calibrate the market depth parameters λi,
we follow the approach proposed by Obizhaeva Obizhaeva (2011): denoting by σi the
average daily volatility of asset i and ADVi the average daily trading volume, it was
shown in Obizhaeva (2011) for a large panel of US stocks that the ratio 1λ
ADV
σr
does not
vary significantly from one asset to another and
1
λ
ADV
σr
≈ 0.33 (29)
Obizhaeva (2011) also argues empirical evidence that the difference in price impact of
buy-originated trades and sell-originated trades is not statistically significant. In order
to lead our empirical study, we use average daily volumes and average daily volatility to
estimate the market depth of each asset, using (29). Alternatively one could use intraday
data, following the methodology proposed in Cont et al. (2010).
4.1 Sector ETFs
We first study fire sales among sector SPDRs, which are sector sub indices of the S&P
500. There exist nine sector SPDRs: Financials (XLF), Consumer Discretionary (XLY),
Consumer Staples (XLP), Energy (XLE), Health Care (XLV), Industrials (XLI), Ma-
terials (XLB), Technology (XLK) and Utilities (XLU) and our goal is to determine
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Sector SPDR Estimated Market Depth
×108 shares
Financials 34.8
Consumer Discretionary 4.4
Consumer Staples 6.2
Energy 8.8
Health Care 6.4
Industrials 8.1
Materials 7.0
Technology 7.9
Utilities 7.1
Table 1: Estimated market depth for SPDRs.
how economic actors investing in those SPDRs liquidated their portfolios following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers.
In order to compute our estimation procedure, we need to know the market depth of
each SPDR, which we can estimate as described in the previous section. Market depths
are given in Table 1. We find that financials have the highest market depth and that
other SPDRs have similar market depths.
We can then apply the estimation method described in Section 3 and find the mag-
nitude of fire sales in each SPDR between September, 15th, 2008 and December, 31st,
2008.
Our method yields an estimate of 86 billion dollars for fire sales afffecting SPDRs
between September, 15th, 2008 and December, 31st, 2008. Using Corollary 3.8, we can
state that with a confidence interval of 99%, the hypothesis that the liquidation matrix
M is equal to zero can be rejected and hence there were significant liquidations during
this period, on this universe of assets. The liquidation volume that we find is equivalent
to a daily liquidation volume of 1.2 billion dollars per day. In comparison, the average
volume on SPDRs before Lehman Brother’s collapse was 5.1 billion dollars per day. This
shows how massive the liquidations were after this market shock.
Corollary 3.2 allows us to determine the composition of the aggregate portfolio liq-
uidated between September 15th 2008 and December, 31st, 2008. The daily liquidated
volumes and the proportions of each SPDR are given in Table 2. This shows that the
aggregate portfolio liquidated after Lehman Brother’s collapse was a long portfolio. This
is consistent with the observation that many financial institutions liquidated equity hold-
ings in order to meet capital requirements during this period, due to the increase of the
risk associated with Lehman Brother’s collapse. The highest volume of liquidations are
associated with financial stocks, followed by the energy sector. Those two sectors repre-
sent 60% of the liquidations and more that 50 billion dollars liquidated before December,
31st, 2008. All other sectors were liquidated in equivalent proportions.
As discussed in Section 3.1, the principal eigenvector of M reflects the common
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Sector SPDR Daily amount liquidated Weight
×106$
Financials 320 28%
Consumer Discretionary 55 5%
Consumer Staples 38 3.5%
Energy 300 26%
Health Care 63 5.5%
Industrials 90 8%
Materials 110 9.5%
Technology 65 5.5%
Utilities 100 9%
Table 2: Daily volume and proportions of fire sales for SPDR between September 15th,
2008 and Dec 31,2008.
Sector SPDR Weight
Financials 78%
Consumer Discretionary 0%
Consumer Staples 2.5%
Energy 4%
Health Care 0%
Industrials 0%
Materials 2.5%
Technology 10%
Utilities 3%
Table 3: Proportions of fire sales between September 15th, 2008 and December, 31st,
2008 associated to the principal eigenvector of M
patterns of fire sales. Table 3 gives the proportions of fire sales associated to the principal
eigenvector of M . We see that this portfolio is essentially made of financials, which have
a weight of 78%. The large weight of XLF, the financial sector index, may be explained
in terms of the loss of investor confidence in banks in the aftermath of the Lehman’s
collapse.
4.2 Eurostoxx 50
We now conduct our analysis on stocks belonging to the Eurostoxx 50 in order to de-
termine the average composition of portfolios diversified among the components of the
Eurostoxx 50 and that were liquidated after Lehman Brother’s filing for bankruptcy.
The Eurostoxx 50 is an equity index regrouping the 50 largest capitalizations of the
Euro zone. It is the most actively traded index in Europe and is used as a benchmark
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to measure the financial health of the euro zone.
We use the same methodology as in the previous section (choice of dates, estimation
of Σ and market depths). Note that we restricted our study to 45 stocks of the index,
for which we had clean data. The 5 stocks left correspond to the lowest capitalizations
among the index components, with very low liquidity.
We find that 350 billion euros were liquidated on stocks belonging to the Eurostoxx 50
between September, 15th, 2008 and December, 31st, 2008. Our statistical test described
in Corollary 3.8 allows us to reject the hypothesis of no liquidation with a confidence
interval of 99%. Our estimate for the liquidated volume is equivalent to a daily liqui-
dation of 5 billion euros, which is equal to one third of the average daily volume of the
index components before September, 15th, 2008.
Figure 5, where each bar represents the weight of a stock in the aggregate liqui-
dated portfolio, shows that most of the liquidations following Lehman Brother’s collapse
involved (long) selling of stocks, i.e. funds selling their holdings.
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Figure 5: Fire sales in Eurostoxx 50 stocks in Fall 2008: each bar represents the weight
of one stock in the aggregate liquidated portfolio
Figure 5 shows that fire sales are more intense for some stocks than others. Table 4
gives the detail of those stocks. As suggested by the previous section, we see that the fire
sales in the Eurostoxx 50 index were concentrated in the financial and energy sectors.
ING and Deutsche Bank account for almost half of the volume liquidated on the whole
index.
5 The hedge fund losses of August 2007
From August 6th to August 9th 2007, long-short market-neutral equity funds experienced
large losses: many funds lost around 10% per day and experienced a rebound of around
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Stock Amount liquidated Weight
×106 e
ING 1100 25%
Deutsche Bank 1000 23%
Eni 750 16%
Arcelor Mittal 350 8%
Intesa San Paolo 320 7%
Unicredito 300 6.5%
Table 4: Most liquidated stocks in the Eurostoxx 50 during the three months following
September, 15th, 2008
15% on August 10th, 2007. During this week, as documented by Khandani and Lo
(2011), market-neutral equity funds whose returns previously had a low historical volatil-
ity exhibited negative returns exceeding 20 standard deviations, while no major move
was observed in equity market indices.
Khandani and Lo (2011) suggested that this event was due to a large market-neutral
fund deleveraging its positions. They simulate a contrarian long-short equity market
neutral strategy implemented on all stocks in the CRSP Database and were able to
reconstitute qualitatively the empirically observed profile of returns of quantitative hedge
funds : low volatility before August 6th, huge losses during three days and a rebound
on August 10th. We reconstituted empirically the returns for Khandani and Lo’s equity
market neutral strategy on the S&P500 for the first three quarters of 2007. Figure 6
shows that this strategy underperforms significantly during the second week of August
2007, while no major move occured in the S&P 500. Such empirical results tend to
confirm the hypothesis of the unwind of a large portfolio, which generated through price
impact large losses across similar portfolios, as predicted by our model.
Using historical data on returns of 487 stocks from the S&P500 index, we have
reconstituted the composition of the fund that deleveraged its positions during the second
week of August 2007 using the estimation procedure described in Section 3 for the periods
[0, T ] = [08/03/2006, 08/03/2007] and [T, T + τliq] = [08/06/2007, 08/09/2007].
Figure 7 displays the composition of the aggregate portfolio liquidated on the S&P500
during this period and found by our estimation method. The first and striking difference
with the case of the deleveraging after Lehman Brother’s collapse is that, during this
quant event, the liquidated portfolio was a long-short portfolio. We clearly see in Figure
7 that for some stocks the liquidated position is significantly negative, meaning that
a short position is being exited. More precisely, 250 stocks have positive weights in
the liquidated portfolio, whereas 237 have negative weights. Furthermore, we find that
the liquidated portfolio was highly leveraged: for each dollar of capital, 15 dollars are
invested in long positions and 14 dollars are invested in short positions.
Importantly, the estimated portfolio is market-neutral in the sense of Equation (30):
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Figure 6: Returns of an market-neutral equity portfolio in 2007, compared with S&P500
returns.
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Figure 7: Composition of the aggregate equity portfolio liquidated during the 2nd week
of August
using the notations of Section 2.4 we find
Λˆ.πµˆt
‖Λˆ‖‖πµˆt ‖
=
n∑
i=1
αi
λi
µitP
i
t
‖Λˆ‖‖πµˆt ‖
= 0.0958 (30)
which corresponds to an angle of 0.47π between the vectors Λˆ and πµˆt , i.e. very close
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to orthogonality. This provides a quantitative explanation for the fact that, although
massive liquidations occurred in the equity markets, index funds were not affected by
this event. Note that, unlike other explanations proposed at the time, this explanation
does not involve any assumption of liquidity drying up during the period of hedge fund
turbulence.
Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 2.2
Assume that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J , fj ∈ C30 , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, φi ∈ C3 and E(‖ξ‖4) <∞. Let
r > 0.
As for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J , fj ∈ C30 , fj is bounded. As a consequence, there exists R > 0
such that, when ‖Sk‖ ≤ r, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
∑
1≤j≤J
αji
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
))
∈ [−R,R]
where V jk and (V
j
k+1)
∗ are defined respectively in (3) and (4). As φi is C3, its third
derivative is bounded on [−R,R]. As a consequence, using a Taylor expansion of φi and
the fact that φi(0) = 0, there exists M > 0 such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for all
x ∈ [−R,R]:
|φ(x)− xφ′(0)− x
2
2
φ′′(0)| ≤M |x|3 (31)
Fix ‖S‖ ≤ r and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Given (2) and (31), we have
∣∣Sik+1 − Sik∣∣ ≤ |Sik|
√τ |ξik+1|+ τ |mi|+M ′
 ∑
1≤j≤J
|αji |‖f ′j‖∞|(V jk+1)∗ − V jk |

As ξ has third-order moments, we find for ‖S‖ ≤ r:
E
(|Sik+1 − Sik|3|Sk = S) ≤ Cτ 32
As a consequence, for ǫ > 0:
P(|Sik+1 − Sik| ≥ ǫ|Sk = S) ≤
1
ǫ3
Cτ
3
2
and we find that for all ǫ > 0 and r > 0:
lim
τ→0
sup
‖S‖≤r
1
τ
P(|Sik+1 − Sik| ≥ ǫ|Sk = S) = 0 (32)
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Fix ‖S‖ ≤ r and let us now calculate for 1 ≤ j ≤ J :
E
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
)
|Sk = S
)
=
1
V j0
f ′j
(
V jk
V j0
)
E
(
(V jk+1)
∗ − V jk |Sk = S
)
+
1
2
1
(V j0 )
2
f ′′j
(
V jk
V j0
)
E
((
(V jk+1)
∗ − V jk
)2 |Sk = S)+o(τ)
where, as the third derivative of fj is bounded and ξ has third order moments, o(τ) =
τh(τ) with h(τ)→ 0 when τ → 0, uniformly for ‖S‖ ≤ r.
As a consequence, given (3) and (4), we find that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J
E
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
)
|Sk = S
)
= f ′j
(
V jk
V j0
)
πj .m
V j0
+
1
2
f ′′j
(
V jk
V j0
)
πj .Σπj
(V j0 )
2
+ o(τ)
(33)
and, using the fact that ξ has fourth order moments, we find that for all 1 ≤ j, l ≤ J
E
((
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
))(
fl
(
(V lk+1)
∗
V l0
)
− fl
(
V lk
V l0
))
|Sk = S
)
= (34)
f ′j
(
V jk
V j0
)
f ′l
(
V lk
V l0
)
πj .Σπl
V j0 V
l
0
+ o(τ)
where πj = (αj1S
1, ..., αjnSn)t.
Denote a : Rn 7→ Sn(R) and b : Rn → Rn such that
ai,p(S) = S
iSp(σ(S)σt(S))i,p
and
bi(S) = S
iµi(S)
where µ and σ are given in Equations 5 and 6. Thanks to (31), (33) and (34) we have
for ‖S‖ ≤ r
E
φi
 ∑
1≤j≤J
αji
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
)) |Sk = S

= τφ′i(0)
∑
1≤j≤J
αji
(
f ′j
(
V jk
V j0
)
πj .m
V j0
+
1
2
f ′′j
(
V jk
V j0
)
πj .Σπj
(V j0 )
2
)
+
τ
2
φ′′i (0)
∑
1≤j,l≤J
αjiα
l
if
′
j
(
V jk
V j0
)
f ′l
(
V lk
V l0
)
πj.Σπl
V j0 V
l
0
+ o(τ)
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As a consequence
E(Sik+1 − Sik|Sk = S) = τbi(S) + o(τ)
which implies that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and r > 0:
lim
τ→0
sup
‖S‖≤r
∣∣∣∣1τ E(Sik+1 − Sik|Sk = S)− bi(S)
∣∣∣∣ = 0 (35)
Furthermore, for 1 ≤ i, p ≤ n and ‖S‖ ≤ r, we have
E
√τξik+1φp
 ∑
1≤j≤J
αjp
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
)) |Sk = S

= τφ′p(0)
∑
1≤j≤J
αjpf
′
j
(
V jk
V j0
)
(Σπj)i
V j0
+ o(τ)
and
E
φi
 ∑
1≤j≤J
αji
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
))φp
 ∑
1≤j≤J
αjp
(
fj
(
(V jk+1)
∗
V j0
)
− fj
(
V jk
V j0
)) |Sk = S

= τφ′i(0)φ
′
p(0)
∑
1≤j,l≤J
αjiα
l
pf
′
j
(
V jk
V j0
)
f ′l
(
V lk
V l0
)
πj .Σπl
V j0 V
l
0
+ o(τ)
As a consequence, for all 1 ≤ i, p ≤ n and r > 0:
lim
τ→0
sup
‖S‖≤r
∣∣∣∣1τ E[(Sik+1 − Sik)(Spk+1 − Spk)|Sk = S]− ai,p(S)
∣∣∣∣ = 0 (36)
a and b are continuous functions and for all S, a(S) is positive and (32), (35) and
(36) hold. Furthermore, as for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J , fj ∈ C30 , a and b are Lipschitz. Define the
differential operator G : C∞0 (R
n) 7→ C10 (Rn) by
Gh(x) =
1
2
∑
1≤i,j≤n
ai,j(x)∂i∂jh+
∑
1≤i≤n
bi(x)∂ih
associated to the stochastic differential equation
dPt = b(Pt)dt+
√
a(Pt)dWt
which is the same equation as the stochastic differential equation given in Theorem 2.4
and which, as a and b are Lipschitz, has a unique strong solution (Pt)t≥0.
By (Ethier and Kurtz, 1986, Theorem 4.2, Ch.7), the process (S⌊ t
τ
⌋)t≥0 converges
in distribution to the solution (P, (Pt)t≥0) of the martingale problem for (G, δS0) when
τ → 0. (Pt)t≥0 is thus the unique solution of the stochastic differential equation given
in Theorem 2.4.
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B Proofs of Proposition 3.1, 3.4 and 3.6
Let us invert (18) under the assumptions of Proposition 3.1. Denote Ω(i) =
 Ω1,i...
Ωn,i

the i-th column of the matrix Ω. By definition, we know that ΠΣL−1Ω(p) = φpΩ(p)
which is equivalent to (Ω(p))tL−1ΣΠ = φp(Ω(p))t.
As (18) is equivalent to MΠΣL−1 + L−1ΣΠM = L−1(C[T,T+τliq] − Σ)L−1 and mul-
tiplying this equality on the left by (Ω(p))t and on the right by Ω(q), we find that
(φp + φq)[Ω
tMΩ]p,q = [Ω
tL−1(C[T,T+τliq] − Σ)L−1Ω]
which gives the matrix ΩtMΩ as a function of Σ and C[T,T+τliq]. As Ω is invertible, this
characterizes the matrix M, as a function, denoted Φ of Σ and C[T,T+τliq], proving (19)
and (20) of Proposition 3.1.
Furthermore, notice that M0 = Φ
(
Σ, C[T,T+τliq] +O(‖Λ‖2)
)
. Given the expression
for Φ in (20), (21) follows directly. This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Assume now that Assumption 3.3 holds. This implies that (19), (20) and (21) hold.
Lemma B.1 The mapping Φ defined in (20) is C∞ in a neighborhood of (Σ, C).
Proof Consider the following mapping:
F : S3n(R) 7→ Sn(R), (S,C,N) 7→ LNΠS + SΠNL +Σ− C (37)
F is infinitely differentiable. The first derivative of F with respect to N, is equal to
∂F
∂N
(S,C,N).H3 = LH3ΠS + SΠH3L
As Σ verifies Assumption 3.3, we showed that ∂F∂N (Σ, C,N) is invertible for all C. As
Φ(Σ, C) is defined as the only matrix verifying F (Σ, C,Φ(Σ, C)) = 0, the implicit func-
tion theorem states that Φ is C∞ in a neighborhood of (Σ, C).
As convergence in probability implies that a sub-sequence converges almost surely,
we assume from now on that the estimators defined in (22) and (23) converge almost
surely. As a consequence, for τ sufficiently small, Σ̂ (τ) also verifies Assumption 3.3 and
we can define M̂ (τ) as in (24).
Lemma B.1 implies in particular that Φ is continuous which implies that Φ(Σ̂(τ), Ĉ(τ))
is a consistent estimator of Φ(Σ, C[T,T+τliq]), meaning that M̂
(τ) is a consistent estimator
of M . This shows Proposition 3.4.
Furthermore Φ ∈ C1 and the central limit theorem for (Σ̂(τ), Ĉ(τ)) given in Proposi-
tion 3.6 is a direct consequence of the delta method for estimators.
29
C Proof of Proposition 3.7
Under the null hypothesis (H0),
1
τliq
∫ T+τliq
T
ct dt = Σ
and hence
Φ
(
Σ,
1
τliq
∫ T+τliq
T
ct dt
)
= Φ(Σ,Σ) = 0
Let us calculate now the first derivative of Φ on (Σ,Σ). Recall that Φ(Σ, C) is
defined as the only element of Sn(R) such that F (Σ, C,Φ(Σ, C)) = 0, where F is defined
in (37). F is affine in each component and as a consequence is C∞ and we can define its
derivatives on (Σ, C,M), ∂F∂Σ (Σ, C,M),
∂F
∂C (Σ, C,M) and
∂F
∂M (Σ, C,M) which are linear
mappings from Sn(R) to Sn(R) defined by:
∂F
∂Σ
(Σ, C,M).H1 = LMΠH1 +H1ΠML+H1
∂F
∂C
(Σ, C,M).H2 = −H2
∂F
∂M
(Σ, C,M).H3 = LH3ΠΣ+ ΣΠH3L
As a consequence, we have
dF (Σ, C,M).(H1,H2,H3) = LMΠH1 +H1ΠML+H1 −H2 + LH3ΠΣ+ ΣΠH3L
In the proof of Lemma B.1, we showed that ∂F∂Σ (Σ, C,M) is invertible. As a conse-
quence we can apply the implicit function theorem in order to compute the derivative
of Φ. As F (Σ, C,Φ(Σ, C)) = 0 and Φ(Σ,Σ) = 0, we find the derivative of Φ on (Σ,Σ):
∇Φ(Σ,Σ).(H1,H2) =
(
∂F
∂M
(Σ,Σ, 0)
)−1
(H2 −H1)
which is equivalent to
∇Φ(Σ,Σ).(H1,H2) = Φ(Σ,Σ+H2 −H1)
Using Proposition 3.6, we find that
1√
τ
M̂ (τ)
L⇒ Φ
(
Σ,Σ+
1
τliq
(ZT+τliq − ZT )−
1
T
ZT
)
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D Proof of Corollary 3.8
Under (H0), we have σσ
t = Σ and the expression for the process V˜t defined in (26) is
simplified as
(V˜tV˜
t
t )
ij,kl = Σi,kΣj,l (38)
which implies that the process Z defined in (25) is gaussian.
Furthermore, given Proposition 3.7, under (H0),
1√
τ
(
P tT M̂
(τ)(PT − PT+τliq )
)
con-
verges in law when τ goes to zero to the random variable
P tTΦ
(
Σ,Σ+
1
τliq
(ZT+τliq − ZT )−
1
T
ZT
)
(PT − PT+τliq )
Given the explicit expression for Φ given in (20), we can find the expression for:
P tTΦ(Σ, C)(PT − PT+τliq )
=
∑
1≤p,q≤n
(Ω−1PT )p
[
ΩtL−1(C − Σ)L−1Ω]
p,q
φp + φq
(Ω−1(PT − PT+τliq ))p
Given the fact that L−1 = diag(λi), we have (Ω−1L−1)p,i = Ωp,iλi and (L−1Ω)j,q =
Ωj,qλj. As a consequence, denoting
mi,j =
∑
1≤p,q≤n
[Ω−1PT ]p[Ω−1(PT − PT+τliq )]q
φp + φq
ΩipΩjqλiλj
we can write P tTΦ(Σ, C)(PT − PT+τliq ) as
∑
1≤i,j≤n
mij(Ci,j − Σi,j). Hence the limit of
1√
τ
(
P tT M̂
(τ)(PT − PT+τliq )
)
is equal to
∑
1≤i,j≤n
mij
(
1
τliq
(ZT+τliq − ZT )−
1
T
ZT
)
i,j
Under assumption (H0), (38) holds and the limit process is gaussian. We now calculate
its variance.
First, let us calculate the variance of
∑
1≤i,j≤n
mijZ
i,j
t which, given the expression of
Z in (25), can be written as∑
1≤k,l≤n
∫ t
0
1√
2
∑
1≤i,j≤n
mi,j
(
V˜ ij,kls + V˜
ji,kl
s
)
dW˜ kls
which has a variance equal to
∑
1≤k,l≤n
∫ t
0
 ∑
1≤i,j≤n
1√
2
mi,j
(
V˜ ij,kls + V˜
ji,kl
s
)2 ds
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=
t
2
∑
1≤k,l≤n
 ∑
1≤i,j,p,q≤n
mi,jmp,q
(
V˜ ij,kls + V˜
ji,kl
s
)(
V˜ pq,kls + V˜
qp,kl
s
)
=
t
2
∑
1≤i,j,p,q≤n
mi,jmp,q
 ∑
1≤k,l≤n
(
V˜ ij,kls + V˜
ji,kl
s
)(
V˜ pq,kls + V˜
qp,kl
s
)
= t
∑
1≤i,j,p,q≤n
mi,jmp,q (Σi,pΣj,q +Σi,qΣj,p)
using the fact that
∑
1≤k,l≤n
V˜ ij,kls V˜
pq,kl
s = Σi,pΣj,q as V˜ verifies (38).
As a consequence, we find that the variance of the gaussian limit is equal to(
1
T
+
1
τliq
) ∑
1≤i,j,k,l≤n
mijmkl (ΣikΣjl +ΣjkΣil)
which concludes the proof of Corollary 3.8.
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